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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VIETNAM WAR
by Anthony A. D'Amato*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most singular pieces of legislation in American
constitutional history passed both houses of the Massachusetts
legislature on April 1st, 1970, and was signed into law on the
following day by Governor Francis W. Sargent. It provides that,
except for an emergency, no inhabitant of Massachusetts inducted
into or serving in the armed forces "shall be required to serve"
abroad in an armed hostility that has not been declared a war by
Congress under Article 1, Section 8, clause 11 of the United
States Constitution. The bill further directs the state's attorney
general to bring a suit testing the legality of the war in the
Supreme Court as a matter of original jurisdiction.
The Massachusetts legislature, in passing the bill, created a
conflict between state law and national policy. It, thereby, hoped
to place before the Supreme Court the question of the bill's
constitutionality, and, derivatively, the constitutionality of the
Vietnam War. The bill asserts the legislators' belief that both the
state of Massachusetts and its citizens are denied their con-
stitutional rights when the President of this country forces those
citizens to fight in an undeclared, and thereby unconstitutional,
war.
Massachusetts asked the Supreme Court to hear the case as a
matter of original jurisdiction which may be invoked under Article
III, Section 2 where a state sues a citizen of another state (the
Secretary of Defense is a citizen of a state other than Massachu-
setts).
The staff members of Attorney General Robert H. Quinn's
office believed that the Supreme Court should hear the case and
declare the war unconstitutional. They filed an 87-page brief in
the Supreme Court against Melvin R. Laird "as he is Secretary of
Defense" requesting a declaration that the war is unconstitutional
and an injunction against further prosecution of the war effort. An
* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University. J.D. 1961, Harvard Univer-
sity; Ph. D. 1968, Columbia University.
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amicus brief in the case was filed by the Constitutional Lawyers'
Committee on Undeclared War.'
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, by a six to three decision
without majority opinion, declined to grant Massachusetts' motion
for leave to file a bill of complaint.2 Thus, Massachusetts is forced
to take its case to the lower federal courts for determination.
Justice William 0. Douglas, dissenting, said that the Court should
not have deferred to executive pressures by refusing to grant
jurisdiction. Instead, Justice Douglas asserted that the Court
should uphold its constitutional duty to resolve questions of
conflicts between branches of governments as it has often done
before.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's refusal to hear this case
as a matter of original jurisdiction, the briefs submitted by Mas-
sachusetts and the Constitutional Lawyers' Committee on Unde-
clared War as amicus suggest why the federal courts should hear
this case and why they should declare the Viet Nam war uncon-
stitutional. Substantial portions of the amicus brief were put be-
fore the California court in Mottola v. Nixon3 which held that the
military-reservist plaintiffs had a sufficient personal stake in their
challenge of the constitutionality of the Vietnam war to fulfill the
standing requirement. In addition, the court ruled that the political
question and sovereign immunity doctrines were not bars to the
suit. With regard to the political question issue, Judge Sweigert
wrote that "to strike down as unconstitutional a President's war-
time seizure of a few private steel mills but to shy away on
'political question' grounds from interfering with a presidential
war itself, would be to strain at a gnat and swallow a camel." 4
I The Committee is composed primarily of young law school teachers of constitutional
law. The brief was written by Anthony D'Amato and Lawrence Velvel. with substantial
contributions by Lawrence Sager. Jon Van Dyke, Harrop Freeman and Richard Cum-
mings.
2 Massachusetts v. Laird, (U.S. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9. 1970), N.Y. Times. Nov. 10, 1970, at
1, col. 5 (city ed).
3 39 U.S.L.W. 2166 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1970).
4 Id. at 2 166-67. Although the court in Mattola did not reach the merits of the case, two
United States District Courts have recently ruled on the ultimate question of the war's
validity, upholding it in each case. In Berk v. Laird. 39 U.S.L.W. 2201 (E.D.N.Y., Sept.
16. 1970). the court held that Congress had authorized through legislative actions the use
of U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam, thereby making unnecessary a formal declaration of
war. A similar argument was advanced by the court in Orlando v. Laird. 39 U.S.L.W.
2069 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 1970), as it pointed to Congressional appropriations for the war,
amendments to the Selective Service Act, and approval of veteran's benefits for partici-
pants in the conflict as examples of action taken in lieu of a declaration of war.
Another recent decision determined, however, that the political question doctrine pre-
vented the court from reaching the merits. Davi v. Laird, 39 U.S.L.W. 2228, 2229 (D.W.
Va. Oct. 9, 1970) held that "the issue of whether a certain instance of hostilities requires a
formal declaration for its legitimation inescapably presents a political question .... Dis-
agreeing with Judge Sweigert's interpretation of the Orlando case, the Davi court refused
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11. THE LEGAL ISSUES
A. Standing
The Secretary of Defense raises two objections to the federal
courts hearing this case: lack of standing and political question.
The issue of standing centers on whether Massachusetts, as a
state, has the right to sue Secretary Laird upon a grievance that
only a draftee would appear to have. There are several answers
why Massachusetts does have this right. First, Massachusetts has
certain proprietary rights as a state which are jeopardized by the
Vietnam War-her schools, whose classes have been disrupted;
her state buildings and police forces, disrupted by mass demon-
strations against the war; her economy, hurt by inflation resulting
from war spending and by inadequate funding of federal welfare
programs. Massachusetts, in support of its assertion of proper
standing, cites the recent case of South Carolina v. Katzenbach,5
where jurisdiction was founded on a controversy between a state
and a citizen of another state under Article II1, Section 2 of the
Constitution. In that case South Carolina claimed that the Voting
Rights Act violated the Fifteenth Amendment, and asserted
among other things, that damage resulted from the disruption of
her electoral procedures. Massachusetts can similarly claim a
disruption in the orderly processes of state government due to a
Federal action of doubtful constitutionality.
Massachusetts can also sue as parens patriae for harm against
her own citizens, of whom over 1,300 young men so far have
given their lives in the war. This principle is not necessarily
limited to those drafted and sent to fight in Vietnam, but may
extend to the tremendous suffering of their relatives, families, and
fiancees. Prior cases have held that a state can sue as parens
patriae when the health and comfort of its citizens are endangered
by activities of another state or person, as for example in pollution
cases crossing state lines.6 Here Massachusetts is claiming a
similar widespread injury to its citizens as a result of the dis-
ruptions of the war.
There are three additional, independent grounds for giving
Massachusetts standing in the federal courts. First, Massachu-
setts has standing to assert the integrity and effectiveness of its
suffrage in the Senate, guaranteed to it by Article V of the Con-
to acknowledge that Orlando could be interpreted as a discussion of the merits of the
Vietnam war's legality.
5 383 U.S. 301 (1-66).
6 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.. 206 U.S. 230 (1907): Missouri v. Illinois.
180 U.S. 208 (1901).
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stitution. Since the effectiveness of the Senate is impaired when a
war is prosecuted which the Senate, as a house in Congress, has
not declared or otherwise authorized, Massachusetts' interest in
the effectiveness of its suffrage in the Senate is impaired as well.
Second, Massachusetts has standing as an original contracting
party to the Constitution to assert its interest in the integrity of
the guarantees contained in the "war clauses" of Article I, Sec-
tion 8. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which antedated
by nine months the Articles of Confederation, said that no Mas-
sachusetts inhabitant could be forced to fight in a war external to
the Commonwealth unless he had either consented or consent
was specifically given by the Massachusetts legislature. In ratify-
ing the United States Constitution, Massachusetts exchanged its
constitutional protection of its inhabitants for the procedural guar-
antees contained in the new Constitution. These basic rights of
the inhabitants were not discarded at the point of ratification.
Rather the right for a Massachusetts inhabitant not to be coerced
to fight in a foreign war without legislative consent (or unless he
volunteers) was preserved in Article I, Section 8: Congress shall
declare war. The contract between Massachusetts and the United
States is violated when the constitutional procedures are not
followed and, thereby, the rights of Massachusetts citizens are not
upheld.
The third non-traditional basis for state standing is contained
only in the amicus brief. It presents an argument based upon
clauses 15 and 16 of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,
neither of which have previously received much judicial attention
with respect to standing.
Immediately preceding these clauses, Congress is given the
power to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy,
and make rules for the regulation of the land and naval forces.
Following this, clauses 15 and 16 of Article I, Section 8 give
Congress the power
to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in
the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Au-
thority of training the Militia according to the discipline pre-
scribed by Congress.
A better understanding of the terms used in these clauses and
the motivations of the Framers in drafting them will demonstrate
their significance with regard to the issue of standing. To the
[VOL. 4:1
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Framers of the Constitution there was a fundamental difference
between the federal "army" and the state "militia." The "army,"
as that term signified in the vocabulary of the day, was strictly a
volunteer organization. Congress could "raise and support" an
army by making army salaries sufficiently attractive to induce men
to serve in it. However, there was to be no federal power of
conscription, for the Founding Fathers shared a fear that the new
national government would become too powerful if it were given
the authority to draft citizens directly into a national armed force. 7
In the event of a conflict which might find the size of the army
raised in this manner insufficient, the Framers provided for "call-
ing forth" the militia -to supply the new government with a body
of men large enough to solve any of the emergencies specified in
clause 15: suppressing an insurrection, repelling an invasion, or
(most broadly) executing a law of the Union. The "militia" was
nothing more than the able-bodied young men of the several
states.8 In other words, a citizen of a state is automatically a
member of its militia (if he is otherwise physically fit). But this in
turn means that a citizen is actually "drafted" into his state
militia, if he is called upon to serve at any time. The militia is not
a voluntary organization, while the federal army is.
In 1918, in a much-criticized opinion, the Supreme Court held
that the federal government could draft citizens to fight in World
War I.9 The present amicus brief for Massachusetts argues that
this case reached the right result, though for the wrong reasons.
When Congress conscripts civilians for a declared war it is in
effect "calling forth" the state militia-that is, it is tapping citizens
who are already members of their state militias. Although Con-
gress may purport to draft civilians directly into the federal army,
the Constitution gives Congress no power of conscription. Thus
the underlying constitutional mechanism must be that Congress is
"calling forth" the militia when it purports to draft young men.
Since World War I was a declared war, fighting in that war was
clearly in execution of a congressional mandate issued strictly
within constitutional boundaries. In other words, it was in execu-
tion of a law of the Union declaring war against Imperial Ger-
many. Execution of a law of the Union is a proper purpose for
calling forth the militia under clause 15, and hence the federal
government had a right to do so both in World War I and World
War II.
4 See Freeman, The Constitutionality of Peacetime Conscription, 31 VA. L. REV. 40
(1944); Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67
MIcH. L. REV. 1493 (1969).
8 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
9 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
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The argument in the amicus brief to Massachusetts v. Laird is
that the militia may only be utilized for purposes specified in
clause 15 of Article I, Section 8, and sending citizens of Mas-
sachusetts to fight in an undeclared foreign war is not one of the
specified purposes. The amicus brief does not argue that Congress
cannot draft civilians in peacetime in preparation for a war nor
that the government is forbidden to use a volunteer army to fight a
war, but rather that the limitations of clause 15 are frustrated at
the point when Congress purports to use a conscripted soldier for
the unconstitutional purpose of fighting abroad in an undeclared
war.
Massachusetts has standing to raise this argument because the
militia was, and is, preeminently a creature of the states. The
Second Amendment to the Constitution speaks of the militia
"being necessary to the security of a free State," and clause 16
indicates the states' interest in the training of the militia. Thus,
when the federal government utilizes the militia in a manner not
sanctioned by the Constitution, the states are illegally deprived of
a portion of their militia and hence should have standing to object
to this deprivation.
B. Political Question
Aside from standing, the Secretary of Defense asserts that the
case should be dismissed on the ground that it raises a "political
question." The "political question doctrine" has in the past been
invoked when a Supreme Court decision would embarrass a polit-
ical branch of the government in its relations with foreign govern-
ments. 10 For example, the Court would not presume to sec-
ond-guess the Executive in a matter of the recognition of a foreign
country.1" However, the case of Massachusetts v. Laird involves
the issue of the division of power between the Executive and
Congress. Neither the Massachusetts brief nor the amicus brief
found a single case in Supreme Court history where the doctrine
of "political question" was invoked in a case involving the dis-
tribution of powers between Congress and the President. Nor
would it make sense to start such a precedent now, for that would
effectively remove the federal judiciary as an "umpire" in this
sensitive area involving the equilibrium of the separation of pow-
10 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) where the court finds that reapportionment is
not within the considerations preventing judicial determination under the doctrine of
political question. One example the court cites of a true political question is the instance
where "we risk embarrassment of our government abroad."
11 369 U.S. at 212, n. 35, where the court cited its opinion in United States v. Klintock,
5 Wheat. 144, 149, that "recognition of foreign governments to strongly defies judicial
treatment that without executive recognition, a foreign state has been called 'a republic of
whose existence we know nothing.' "
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ers. Indeed, the Supreme Court has in the past decided many
cases of great importance involving legislative-executive powers
quickly disposing of "political question" considerations. 12
C. Constitutionality of the War
The questions of standing and political question must be re-
solved before a court can reach the merits of the case. Assuming
both questions are answered in favor of Massachusetts, the initial
substantive consideration is whether Congress by its action has
given the equivalent of a declaration of war. Clearly Congress has
never formally issued a declaration of war. Yet, over the past few
years the government has raised various arguments, in cases in
the lower courts, in addresses to Congress and in press confer-
ences and publicity releases, to the effect that Congress by its
actions has declared the existence of war.
At different times, different arguments seemed to be in "style."
The first government argument was that the SEATO treaty pro-
vided the basis for our involvement in the war since treaties, along
with laws of Congress, are the supreme law of the land. This
argument has no validity. The operative language of the treaty is
that in the event of aggression each Party to the treaty agrees to
act "in accordance with its constitutional processes."13 In short, if
a declaration of war is needed in the absence of a treaty, this
language makes certain that it is also needed in the presence of
the treaty. Thus, the treaty does not help substantiate the govern-
ment's position.
A second argument was that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was
the equivalent of a declaration of war. Many Congressmen have
been incensed by this argument, for the resolution was clearly not
intended to be a declaration of war. The Congressmen cite the
Congressional debates at the time to substantiate their knowledge
that the resolution was adopted simply to approve the President's
use of force in repelling attacks against two United States naval
vessels operating in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and August
12 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In the Court and
concurring opinions, it was emphasized both that the President lacked the Constitutional
power to seize private property and, also, that regardless of such power, the President was
precluded from exercising it when confronted with specific legislation designed to meet the
emergency. Thus, in this instance, the court upheld the legislative determinations when
they conflicted with subsequent Presidential actions.
See also the Japanese Exclusion cases of World War II, Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex Parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283 (1944); the Prize cases of the Civil War, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); and
the passport case of Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); and others: Little v. Barreme, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Bas v. Tingey, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); The Pedro, 175
U.S. 354 (1899); Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
13 T.I.A.S. 3170.
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4, 1964. The language of the Resolution, moreover, lacks the
specificity of a declaration of war; indeed, it is so broad that it can
be argued that if it is a declaration of war then it is an uncon-
stitutional delegation of the power to decide whether to go to war
from Congress to the President. 14 Aside from the above, there is
significant congressional opinion that the government misled the
Congress about the events in the Gulf of Tonkin that occasioned
the Resolution. 15 Thus, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution lends little
to the government case.
A third argument is based upon the military role of the execu-
tive. The government claims that as commander-in-chief, the
President has the power and responsibility to protect American
fighting forces in Vietnam, and therefore has to follow a reason-
able course in de-escalating the war effort. To date, this has meant
rotating troops in and out of Vietnam and not withdrawing the
troops so quickly as to prejudice the position of the remaining
troops. Even if this is arguably a political justification for the war,
it clearly is not a legal one. Instead, this is a classic bootstrap
argument: A war illegally started becomes legal because you have
'to protect the troops that were there illegally in the first place.
The fourth, and final, argument espoused by the government is
that Congress in appropriating over $110 billion on the war there-
by authorized the war. The government suggests that if Congress
did not approve the war, it would not have appropriated the
money. This argument has a surface plausibility, and indeed raises
basic questions about the war powers of Congress.
Article I, Section 8, clause 11 gives to Congress the power "to
declare war." These words are open to a spectrum of in-
terpretations, ranging from giving Congress the sole power to
initiate war to merely allowing Congress to recognize a state of
war by "declaring" its existence after it has begun. The records of
the Constitutional Convention show that the true meaning is very
close to the first extreme-giving Congress the sole power to
initiate war. Indeed, the original language proposed for this Ar-
ticle was power to "make" war. But because some delegates
believed that this would prevent the President from responding to
an emergency situation before Congress could assemble and act,
the word was changed to "declare." 1 6 In any event, the delegates
clearly intended that only the Congress could initiate war. This
i478 Stat. 384 (1964).
15 See PUSEY, THE WAY WE Go To WAR 115-34 (1969); Hearings Before Senate,
Comm. on Foreign Relations,'9Oth Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968).
'
6 J. MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 341 (Int'l ed. G.
Hunt & J. Scott 1920).
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historical interpretation was clearly set forth in a recent Court of
Appeals decision. 17
Of course, it would be frivolous to contend that the Con-
stitution requires Congress to use the words "declare war" and
none other. Surely Congress may authorize war, or it may specif-
cally ratify a war in progress.' 8 However, to constitute the
equivalent of a declaration of war, the amicus brief contends that
an authorization or ratification must be intentional, specific and
discrete. The intention cannot be loosely inferred from Congres-
sional behavior over a period of time. To prevent the real power
to wage and declare war from being broadly delegated to the
President, the authorization must specifically name either an ene-
my or a location for hostilities. Furthermore, to avoid the chilling
or coercive effect which might result if a declaration of war were
inextricably tied to a piece of essential domestic legislation, the
authorization must be contained in a separate legislative act. Mili-
tary appropriation bills, and additions over the years to the Selec-
tive Service Act, do not meet these criteria.
Even more significantly, an appropriation bill usually is passed
after the fact. A war has begun, then Congress is asked to support
it. Many legislators have objected to this, saying that they cannot
in good conscience withhold funds from American boys in the
field who need munitions and food, even though they do not
support the war effort by voting those funds. However, even apart
from such objections, the appropriations argument turns the Con-
stitutional scheme on its head. Instead of Congress making laws
subject to Presidential veto, the President is in effect making a law
by declaring a war, and Congress is only given a veto after the
fact. This is a very hard "veto" to exercise, given the fact that a
war contains momentum of its own which serves to justify it once
it has begun. Moreover, if Congress attempts to pass affirmative
legislation cancelling the war, the President could ultimately veto
this legislation, thus necessitating a two-thirds Congressional vote
to override the veto. Surely the Constitution is radically changed
when it is interpreted as giving Congress the power to stop a war
by a two-thirds vote rather than giving Congress the power to
initiate war by a vote of the majority.
Although some appropriations bills may be considered to pro-
vide for money in advance, they can never be held to be the
17 Berk v. Laird, No. 35007 (2d Cir., June 19, 1970).
18 War was declared against Japan on December 8, 1941 ; since the war had started for
the United States the preceding day, Congress, in a sense, was ratifying an on-going war.
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equivalent of an authorization of war, due to vagueness. The fact
that billions of dollars are spent for defense does not indicate
which funds must be used in which place against what enemy.
Even if it did, the President could support a war by juggling funds
from one defense account to another. In short, this interpretation
of the appropriations bills would amount to an overly broad
delegation by Congress to the President of the power to decide on
war. Unless the declaration-of-war clause is to be read out of the
Constitution, Congress must be the body to exercise this power
and not the Executive. Even if Congress wants to delegate it,
Massachusetts brings this case to prevent such delegation.
III. CONCLUSION
The need to prevent executive wars has not waned since the
days when the constitution was written. At the time of this coun-
try's most divisive war, President Lincoln, one of the greatest
proponents of Presidential powers, said:
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making pow-
er to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the follow-
ing reasons: Kings had always been involving and impover-
ishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not al-
ways, that the good of the people was the object. This our
convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly
oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution
that no one man should hold the power of bringing this
oppression upon us. 19
Today, when this country is confronted with another tremen-
dously divisive war, it is important that we not lose sight of the
fact that the Constitution was a vehicle to forever eliminate the
leadership of kings who after embroiling their nations in wars
would go to parliaments to get bailed out.
The Massachusetts bill contests the power of Presidents to be
kings. Massachusetts asks that the power to declare war be re-
turned to the Congress, as provided by the terms of the Con-
stitution. Massachusetts, in its complaint, requests that the Presi-
dent be given 90 days in order to obtain the explicit consent of
Congress to prolong American fighting in the Vietnamese War;
otherwise, the war must cease-air attacks must be halted and
ground troops removed. This decision would force Congress to
approve the war by affirmative legislation, require immediate
19 R. BASLER, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 452 (1953).
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withdrawal (by its inaction), or provide a timetable for withdrawal
on the grounds that it does not approve American involvement in
the war yet feels immediate withdrawal strategically unadvisable.
Regardless of its choice, the decision to declare war is again
vested in the Congress.
The vision of the Framers, spelled out with great clarity in the
Constitution, is now confronting the judiciary. The case may be
heard, or it, and the clear intent of the Constitution, may be
rendered a topic valuable only to academia thus vindicating those
who assert that the constitutionality of the war will never be
authoritatively decided.
